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Dr. James Fan—Naval Postgraduate School [james.fan@nps.edu] 
Abstract 
This paper offers an economic model to assist public procurement officials in ranking competing 
vendors when benefits cannot be monetized. An important defense application is “source 
selection”—choosing the most cost-effective vendor to supply military equipment, facilities, 
services, or supplies. The problem of ranking public investment alternatives when benefits cannot 
be monetized has spawned an extensive literature that underpins widely applied decision tools. 
The bulk of the literature, and most government-mandated decision tools, focuses on the demand 
side of a public procurement. The “economic evaluation of alternatives” (EEoA) extends the 
analysis to the supply side. A unique feature of EEoA is to model vendor decisions in response to 
government funding projections. Given a parsimonious set of continuously differentiable 
evaluation criteria, EEoA provides a new tool to rank vendors. In other cases, it offers a valuable 
consistency check to guide government supplier decisions. 
Keywords: defense acquisition, decision analysis, multi-attribute auction 
Introduction 
As nations struggle to recover from a global pandemic that devastated lives and 
destroyed economic activity, massive government spending aimed at limiting the damage has 
shattered fiscal balance sheets. Record deficits and debt will place nations under enormous 
pressure to trim defense expenditures. To preserve capabilities, hard choices lie ahead that 
require a sober assessment of security challenges, and robust methodologies to prioritize 
defense and other public investments.  
Defense procurement is big business. Recently the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) 
spent over $300 billion on acquisition, research, development, test, and evaluation, most of it 
sourced to the private sector (Schwartz et al., 2018). The Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development reports member countries spend more than 12% of their 
cumulative GDP on public purchases (OECD, 2016). Significant academic effort has been 
focused on the defense acquisition process through an economic lens; these include theoretical 
studies (Cavin, 1995), experimental studies (Davis, 2011; Kirkpatrick, 1995), and empirical 
studies (Horowitz et al., 2016). Indeed, understanding and improving the efficiency and 
effectiveness of public procurement is of utmost practical and academic importance. 
One of the biggest challenges for public procurement officials is to rank vendors when 
benefits cannot be monetized. Indeed, government benefits are often depicted as bundles of 
desirable characteristics or attributes that cannot easily be combined with costs into a single 
overall measure such as profitability. The problem of ranking public investment alternatives 
when benefits cannot be monetized has spawned an extensive literature generally referred to as 
multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM). A proliferation of applications of decision tools derived 
from this literature has appeared in the fields of management science, operations research, and 
decision sciences (prominent examples include Keeney & Raiffa [1976]; Kirkwood [1995, 1997]; 
Clemen [1996]; Parkes & Kalagnanam [2005]; Ewing et al. [2006]).  
Today, widespread application of MCDM tools and techniques is mandated through 
various laws, rules, and regulations that govern public procurement, though the specific 
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approach is not prescribed. For example, the main guide for federal procurement officials in the 
United States is the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR).1  
Evaluation criteria are the factors an agency uses to determine which of several 
competing proposals submitted in response to an RFP [Request for Proposal] 
would best meet the agency’s needs. In establishing effective evaluation criteria, 
an agency must clearly identify the factors relevant to its selection of a vendor 
and then prioritize or weight the factors according to their importance in satisfying 
the agency’s need in the procurement. …This allows the agency to rank the 
proposals received. (FAR, Proposal Development, Section M-Evaluation Factors 
for Award) 
Similar source selection techniques are frequently applied in the United States at state and local 
levels, and in the private sector.  
While demand side developments of MCDM models have been extensively studied in 
the academic literature, the literature is mostly silent about the supply side (vendor) problem. 
Vendor decisions (bid proposals) are generally treated as exogenous in the Decision Sciences 
and Operations Research literature. In contrast, the economic evaluation of alternatives (EEoA) 
captures both demand side—procurement official decisions—and supply side—vendor 
optimization decisions. Our model formulation is in the spirit of Lancaster’s (1966, 1971) 
“Characteristics Approach to Demand Theory” as modified by Ratchford (1979), and closely 
corresponds to the third of six approaches to structure an EEoA introduced in Chapter 4 of 
“Military Cost–Benefit Analysis: Theory & Practice” (Melese, 2015, p. 96). 
EEoA encourages public procurement officials to carefully consider the impact on vendor 
proposals of announced priorities (i.e., desired criteria, characteristics, or attributes for solicited 
quantities of products, services, or projects, such as computer systems, vehicles, weapon 
systems, logistics packages, and buildings). Officials should also consider the impact of 
anticipated future budgets. In response to government-issued priorities—evaluation criteria, 
quantities, and funding—competing vendors, with different input costs and technologies 
(described using “engineering production functions”)2 maximize their production offers—bid 
proposals that consist of bundles of non-price characteristics or attributes.  
EEoA models public procurement official decisions in two stages. In the first stage, along 
with the requirement (quantity demanded), and funding guidance, the procurement official 
reveals desired evaluation criteria (characteristics or attributes) of the product or service (but not 
the relative importance/weights). Given this information, competing vendors engage in 
constrained optimizations based on their respective production technologies (“engineering 
production functions”), and input costs, to generate proposals that match anticipated future 
funding. Since input costs and production functions vary among vendors, they play a critical role 
in their bid proposals—interpreted as bundles of non-price characteristics or attributes 
embedded in each identical unit offered by a particular vendor. In the second stage, the 
 
1 Note the exclusive focus on the demand side in the FAR (i.e., ranking exogenously-determined bids received from 
vendors; see https://www.acquisition.gov/browse/index/far). Also note that standard practice for U.S. military (and 
other procurement officials) is to: 1) announce factors (“evaluation criteria”) relevant to the selection, but then only 
after receiving vendor proposals, 2) assign specific relative importance/weights to those factors to rank vendors. 
This practice is modeled in the economic evaluation of alternatives (EEoA). 
2 For interesting discussions of “engineering production functions,” see Chenery (1949), Kurtz & Manne (1963), 
Wibe (1984), Charnes et al. (1991), and Hildebrand (1999). 
 
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 282 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
procurement official ranks competing vendors according to the government’s utility function over 




FIGURE 1. The Two-Stage Procurement Process 
 
The dual objective of EEoA is to encourage governments: 1) to consider the supply side 
(i.e., to recognize the importance of modeling vendor responses to information provided or 
inferred in public procurements); and 2) to offer an alternative to the standard MCDM approach 
when benefits cannot be monetized. An attractive feature of EEoA is that it offers a novel 
technique to measure “benefits” that serves as a valuable consistency check for MCDM 
preference trade-offs among key attributes.4 We explore assumptions under which the two 
decision models (MCDM and EEoA) are isomorphic from a procurement official’s perspective. In 
practice, however, we demonstrate how EEoA can yield significantly different solutions (rank 
orderings of vendors) than the standard MCDM approach.  
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section develops the two-stage economic 
evaluation of alternatives (EEoA) model. On the supply side, two cases are presented to 
illustrate the model: 1) where vendors have identical attribute costs, but different production 
technologies (“engineering production functions”); and 2) where vendors have different attribute 
costs, but identical production technologies. A simple example serves to integrate procurement 
official (demand) considerations, with vendor (supply) decisions, under varying (probabilistic) 
scenarios. The next section contrasts an application of EEoA, with the standard textbook 
application of MCDM. The last section concludes with recommendations for future research. 
 
3 Note this is analogous to steps mandated in the FAR, except that, since funding is fixed in EEoA (i.e., the unit 
price is the same for each vendor), the second step involves the submission by vendors of sealed non-price bids for 
the announced level of funding, interpreted and evaluated by procurement officials as bundles of characteristics and 
attributes that respond to previously announced evaluation criteria (for example, see FAR 14.5). 
4 Both Australian and Canadian Ministries of Defence are considering implementing this consistency check for the 
MCDM component of their portfolio decision models. (Personal correspondence with fellow NATO SAS-134 
Defence Official Panel Members studying Defence Portfolio Management for NATO; emails received 11/2018) 
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The Economic Evaluation of Alternatives (EEoA) Model 
The challenge for our public procurement official is to select a competing vendor that 
delivers the best performance (combination of desired non-price attributes) for each identical 
unit of a requirement (e.g., 100 ventilators, or 50 computers, or 20 drones, or 2 hospital ships), 
at affordable funding levels. The EEoA framework can be thought of as a multi-attribute sealed 
bid procurement auction that extends traditional price-only auctions to one in which competition 
among 𝑗𝑗 ∈ [1,𝑚𝑚] vendors (bidders) takes place exclusively over bundles of 𝑖𝑖 ∈ [1,𝑛𝑛] non-price 
characteristics or attributes (𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖).5  
The EEoA model structures the problem as a two-stage optimization (see Figure 1). In 
the first stage, the public procurement official provides 𝑗𝑗 competing vendors with the evaluation 
criteria, available funding, and the requirement (quantity demanded).6 Given the anticipated 
budget, B, and their respective production technologies (“engineering production functions”) and 
input costs, competing vendors offer their best possible non-price attribute packages bundled 
into each identical unit required.7 Note that the greater the funding available, the greater the 
available funding per unit, which allows vendors to bundle more of the desired attributes into 
each identical unit (e.g., better ventilators, computers, drones, ships).8  
The vendor (supply side) problem is formulated in the section titled First Stage EEoA: 
The Vendor’s Problem (Supply Side). Competition takes place exclusively over non-price bid 
proposals from each vendor, evaluated by procurement officials as bundles of attributes offered 
by each vendor for a standard unit of the requirement. Whereas attributes for each unit of the 
requirement are identical for each vendor, the proposed bundles differ among vendors. 
Competing vendors’ bid proposals (bundles of attributes) depend on a vendor’s specific costs to 
generate each attribute, their individual engineering production function to combine those 
attributes, and anticipated future funding.  
In the second stage, the procurement official’s objective is to select the vendor 𝑗𝑗 that 
maximizes the government’s utility function, 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 =  𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖(𝑎𝑎1𝑖𝑖 ,𝑎𝑎2𝑖𝑖, … ,𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖), subject to projected 
funding (i.e., the per unit affordability or budget constraint), B. For analytic tractability we 
assume the utility function is quasi-concave, and that attributes are continuous, non-negative, 
monotonic increasing variables (i.e., the domain of the buyer’s utility function, and sellers’ 
production functions and attribute cost functions) are the nonnegative real numbers. Non-
satiation in the relevant range of attributes is also assumed, such that, 𝜕𝜕𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖⁄ >0, or the 
greater the score of the 𝑖𝑖 ∈ [1,𝑛𝑛] desired attributes, 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, the more value (utility/benefit) for the 
buyer, but the more costly it is for sellers to produce. 
 
5 For example, in the case of military medical transportation of patients to receive emergency treatment, safe 
transport may require the use of a reliable ventilator. In evaluating ventilators, some key attributes include battery 
duration, gas consumption, and levels of leakage (L’Her et al., 2014, Blakeman & Branson, 2013). 
6 Since there is a fixed requirement (quantity demanded), the budget, B, can be interpreted as the unit 
funding/budget available to vendors to produce a unit of the required product or service. For example, if we 
anticipate $25,000 of funding is available for 50 computers, the budget (B) used by competing vendors to build their 
proposals would be $500 per unit. 
7 For example, suppose we have $25,000 of funding for 50 computers, or a budget, B=$500/unit. Then, for example, 
each of 50 identical Apple notebook computers offered at $500/unit would satisfy the basic evaluation criteria 
(screen size, memory, battery life, software), but consist of a somewhat different bundle of those 
characteristics/attributes, than each of 50 identical Microsoft (or Dell, or HP) notebook computers. 
8 The greater the funding available, the greater the funding per unit, allowing vendors to offer more of the desired 
attributes for each identical unit demanded by the buyer. For example, suppose for our 50 computers, instead of 
$25,000 (B=$500) of funding, it turns out $50,000 (B=$1000) will be available. Then each of the 50 identical 
notebook computers offered by Apple will have more and/or better characteristics/attributes, and so will each of the 
50 identical notebook computers offered by Microsoft (e.g. bigger screens, more memory, longer battery life). 
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Following the literature, we allow the buyer’s utility function (scoring/ranking rule) to be 
linear, additive, and separable across attributes (see Keeney & Raiffa, 1976; Kirkwood, 1997). 
The public procurement official’s problem is to select a vendor 𝑗𝑗 ∈ [1,𝑚𝑚] that maximizes the 
government’s utility function:  
(1) 𝑼𝑼𝒋𝒋 = Uj�𝑨𝑨𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇� = 𝑾𝑾𝑨𝑨𝑖𝑖T, 
where desired attributes are known to sellers, and the bundle of attributes in vector 𝑨𝑨𝒋𝒋 = 
[𝑎𝑎1𝑖𝑖 𝑎𝑎2𝑖𝑖 … 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖] represents each vendor’s offer (bid proposal) for each unit required. The relative 
weights for each attribute are the procurement official’s private information, given by the vector: 
𝑾𝑾 = (𝑤𝑤1,𝑤𝑤2,𝑤𝑤3, … ,𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛 | 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 ∈ ℝ+, 𝑖𝑖 ∈ [1,𝑛𝑛]). 
The procurement official maximizes (1) subject to a funding/affordability constraint:  
(2) 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖  ≤  𝐁𝐁, 
such that the total unit cost (price) of any vendor’s bid proposal, 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖, must fit within forecasted 
future funding (i.e., the per unit budget). 𝐁𝐁. Note that whereas the set of non-price attributes in 
the buyer’s utility function are revealed to the 𝑗𝑗 ∈ [1,𝑚𝑚] competing vendors, the relative 
(preference or “trade-off”) weights, 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖, are not.9 This reflects practical application of the FAR:  
 
In government acquisition, procuring commands have their own best practices 
and priorities … but they all follow the [Federal Acquisition Regulation]. And in 
their selection of suppliers, they assign weights to their parameter criteria in 
accord with their priorities. … These weights for scoring of proposals do not have 
to be specifically revealed as an algorithm, but are typically communicated to 
offerors in terms of [rank ordering of] importance. 
Colonel John T. Dillard, U.S. Army (Retired), 
Past Program Manager for Advanced Acquisition Programs 
 
In this formulation of the procurement problem, both buyer and seller suffer from 
imperfect and asymmetric information. While the seller does not know the specific relative 
importance/weights assigned to desired attributes (or “evaluation criteria”), the buyer 
(procurement official) does not know the vendors’ costs of producing a particular attribute, nor 
the technology (engineering production functions) that combines those attributes into vendor 
proposals.10 The supply side vendor problem is examined in detail in the next section, followed 
by the demand side procurement problem. 
First Stage EEoA: The Vendor’s Problem (Supply Side) 
The first stage of the two-stage EEoA optimization framework focuses on the vendor’s 
problem. The economic approach assumes vendors are strategic players, so that the 
anticipated/forecasted (per unit) funding/budget, B, for the procurement, impacts vendors’ 
 
9 For example, consider the following summary of Federal Acquisitions Regulations (FAR) Sections 15.1 and 15.3 
“Evaluating proposals under the RFP [Request for Proposal] best value trade-off analysis criteria”: In a negotiated 
bid there are factors [evaluation criteria] with varying weights assigned. The solicitation tells you the weight of each 
factor. However, government contracting agencies are not required to publicize the actual source selection plan [it is 
an internal document]. The agency has broad discretion on what it believes to be the best value. Note, however, the 
agency must be consistent in following their source selection plan in evaluating every vendor, or risk bid protests—
e.g., see Melese (2018). 
10 “Seller costs can be expected to depend on [the] local manufacturing base, and sellers can be expected to be well 
informed about the cost of (upstream) raw materials” (Parkes & Kalagnanam, 2005, p. 437). 
 
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 285 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
formulation of their competing bid proposals. Vendor bid proposals consist of optimal attribute 
bundles, 𝑨𝑨𝒋𝒋, from competing firms that maximize overall performance (output, 𝑸𝑸𝒋𝒋) given their 
respective engineering production functions, costs, and constraints.11 
Specifically, given n desired attributes (𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), and anticipated future funding (the per unit 
budget, B), the 𝑚𝑚 vendors each offer competing bid proposals (bundles of attributes), 𝑨𝑨𝒋𝒋, based 
on their production technology,12 and their unit costs of producing each attribute, 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑩𝑩).13 For 
any fixed requirement (quantity demanded) and funding level (per unit budget, B), a 
representative vendor’s problem is to maximize the attribute output/performance of each 
(identical) unit required, subject to the vendor’s costs of producing each attribute. Wise & 
Morrison (2000) observe that a multi-attribute auction allows competing vendors to differentiate 
themselves in the auction process and bid on their competitive advantages. Competing vendors 
offer their best possible non-price attribute bundle for the projected per unit funding/budget, B, 
given their idiosyncratic technology reflected in their respective “engineering” production 
functions given by Equation 3.  
The vendor’s problem can be expressed as selecting an attribute vector (bid proposal), 
𝑨𝑨𝒋𝒋 = [𝑎𝑎1𝑖𝑖,𝑎𝑎2𝑖𝑖, … ,𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖] that maximizes output or “product performance” given by their engineering 
production function:  
(3) 𝑸𝑸𝒋𝒋 = 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖(𝑨𝑨𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇), 
subject to total unit costs (TC) not exceeding anticipated per unit funding (B) for the project,  
(4)  𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝒋𝒋 =  ∑ 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 (𝐵𝐵) 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≤  𝐁𝐁. 
Hollis Chenery was the first economist to introduce “engineering production functions” 
similar to Equation 3. In his pioneering article in the Quarterly Journal of Economics, he 
observes: “The engineer must usually resort to testing various sizes and combinations of 
equipment to determine the effect of such variables as size, speed, temperature, etc., upon total 
performance” (Chenery, 1949).14 A detailed survey by Soren Wibe (1984) in Economica offers a 
useful contrast between “engineering” and “economic” production functions.15 Similarly, but in a 
different context, Hildebrandt (1999) in this journal introduced what he calls a “technological 
military production function” derived from underlying technical relationships that relate military 
inputs to measures of effectiveness/performance. In his study, alternatives are scored along 
their important attributes to estimate a measure of effectiveness that reflects capabilities 
required to complete a mission. Although their theoretical foundations differ, engineering 
production functions parallel traditional MCDM approaches in the use of so-called “value” 
functions to estimate effectiveness.  
For ease of exposition, the remainder of the study focuses on two vendors and two (non-
price) attributes. We assume each vendor has a different technology (engineering production 
 
11 Note the supply-side development in this section generalizes a special case of the multi-attribute auction found in 
Simon and Melese (2011). 
12 Each vendor’s bundle is a technologically-determined combination of attributes: for instance, a computer is a 
combination of screen size, memory, battery life, and others with unit costs associated with each attribute.  
13 For instance, with bigger budgets, a vendor’s costs to provide more of a particular attribute (say computer 
memory) might enjoy increasing returns to scale because of quantity discounts. 
14 Chenery (1949) connects his engineering approach to production functions to studies that helped motivate 
Lancaster (1966), stating: “The use of multi-dimensional products has already been suggested in the field of 
consumption” (p. 514). 
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function) to combine the two attributes, and different attribute costs. The Lagrangian function for 
the vendor’s problem is given by:  
(5) ℒ𝑖𝑖  = 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖(𝑎𝑎1𝑖𝑖  ,𝑎𝑎2𝑖𝑖 ,𝑩𝑩) + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖[𝑩𝑩 − ∑ 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2𝑖𝑖=1 (𝑩𝑩) 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖], for j=1,2. 
Since vendors compete on their product’s quality/performance, we assume they will use the 
maximum expected per unit funding, B, to develop their bid proposals, so that Equation 4 is an 
equality. First order necessary conditions for an optimum are given by: 
(5a) 𝜕𝜕ℒ𝑖𝑖 𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎1𝑖𝑖⁄ = 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎1𝑖𝑖⁄  – 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐1𝑖𝑖(𝑩𝑩) = 0, 
 
(5b) 𝜕𝜕ℒ𝑖𝑖 𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎2𝑖𝑖⁄ = 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎2𝑖𝑖⁄  – 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐2𝑖𝑖(𝑩𝑩) = 0, 
 
(5c) 𝜕𝜕ℒ𝑖𝑖 𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖⁄ = 𝑩𝑩 −∑ 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2𝑖𝑖=1 (𝑩𝑩) 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 0. 
Solving Equations 5a–5c, yields optimal attribute bid proposals (performance outputs) for each 
vendor 𝑗𝑗 = 1,2, for each identical unit required, for any given per unit budget, B:  
(6a) 𝑎𝑎1𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝑎𝑎1𝑖𝑖∗ (𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖(𝑩𝑩), 𝑦𝑦2𝑖𝑖(𝑩𝑩), 𝑐𝑐1𝑖𝑖(𝑩𝑩), 𝑩𝑩), 
 
(6b) 𝑎𝑎2𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝑎𝑎2𝑖𝑖∗ (𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖(𝑩𝑩), 𝑦𝑦2𝑖𝑖(𝑩𝑩), 𝑐𝑐2𝑖𝑖(𝑩𝑩), 𝑩𝑩). 
For purposes of illustration, we assume a standard Cobb-Douglas (see Cobb & Douglas, 
1928; Douglas, 1976) engineering production function in the spirit of Charnes et al. (1991) and 
others, with two attributes (𝑎𝑎1𝑖𝑖 , 𝑎𝑎2𝑖𝑖) as inputs:  




where the elasticities, 𝑦𝑦𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 (i.e., the % change in output/performance from a % increase in an 
attribute), are assumed to be independent of available funding (the budget, 𝑩𝑩), and sum to 1. 16 
As stated by Charnes et al. (1986), the Cobb-Douglas engineering production function 
given by Equation 6 is “the simplest … case of static production with a single output [bundle of 
attributes] to be produced with a single function—one to a firm [vendor] or plant—from factors 
[yielding attributes] which are acquired at fixed prices per unit [i.e., fixed unit costs to produce 
each attribute].” In terms of our model, this suggests starting with the assumption that the unit 
costs for each vendor, j, are independent of available funding, or that: 𝑐𝑐1𝑖𝑖(𝑩𝑩) = 𝑐𝑐1𝑖𝑖, and 
𝑐𝑐2𝑖𝑖(𝑩𝑩) = 𝑐𝑐2𝑖𝑖. 
Two special cases help illustrate our model: 1) where vendors share common attribute 
costs, but have different production technologies (engineering production functions), and 2) 
where vendors share the same production technology, but have different attribute costs. 
Vendors with Common Costs and Different Technologies  
In the first case (illustrated in Figure 2), vendors 𝑗𝑗 = 1,2 have identical, attribute costs 
(i.e., 𝑐𝑐1𝑖𝑖(𝑩𝑩) = 𝑐𝑐1 and 𝑐𝑐2𝑖𝑖(𝑩𝑩) = 𝑐𝑐2), but different, constant engineering production functions (i.e., 
 
16 Interestingly, an article by Marsden et. al. (1972) in Applied Economics shows how a Cobb-Douglas production 
function for waste treatment plants can be derived from chemical and biological laws. Another notable engineering 
production function study by Kurtz & Manne (1963) in the American Economic Review estimates a Cobb-Douglas 
production function from engineering data for various metal machining processes. They also emphasize “it is the 
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𝑦𝑦11 ≠ 𝑦𝑦12 and 𝑦𝑦21 ≠ 𝑦𝑦22). From the first order necessary conditions for an optimum ((5a) – (5c)), 
and (6), competing vendors’ optimal attribute bundle bid proposals, for the expected per unit 
funding/budget level B, are given by: 
(6a’) 𝑎𝑎1𝑖𝑖∗ = [𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖/(𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖 + 𝑦𝑦2𝑖𝑖) 𝑐𝑐1] B, and 
 
(6b’) 𝑎𝑎2𝑖𝑖∗ = [𝑦𝑦2𝑖𝑖/(𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖 + 𝑦𝑦2𝑖𝑖) 𝑐𝑐2] B. 
Figure 2 illustrates optimal attribute bundle bid proposals for each vendor for a specific 
unit funding/budget level, B: 𝐴𝐴1 = (𝑎𝑎11∗ ,𝑎𝑎21∗ ) and 𝐴𝐴2 = (𝑎𝑎12∗ ,𝑎𝑎22∗ ). The optimum for each vendor is 
determined graphically by the tangency of each vendor’s isoquant (derived from their separate 
production functions), with the common budget constraint.  
 
EEoA: Vendor Expansion Paths with same Costs 
Maximize Attribute Bundle subject to Budget Constraint
(Assumptions: Identical, constant, attribute costs (i.e. 𝑐𝑐11 𝑩𝑩 = 𝑐𝑐12 𝑩𝑩 = 𝑐𝑐1 and 𝑐𝑐21(𝑩𝑩) =
𝑐𝑐22(𝑩𝑩) = 𝑐𝑐2), and different, constant, technology (i.e. attribute output elasticities are 









Vendors’ budget constraint: TC = 𝑐𝑐1𝑎𝑎1  +  𝑐𝑐2𝑎𝑎2  =  𝑩𝑩  =>   𝑎𝑎2  =  𝑩𝑩/𝑐𝑐2 – 𝑐𝑐1/𝑐𝑐2 𝑎𝑎1
𝑩𝑩/𝑐𝑐2
B/𝑐𝑐1
𝒂𝟏𝟏∗ = [𝑦𝑦12/ 𝑦𝑦11 + 𝑦𝑦21 𝑐𝑐𝟏]𝑩𝑩
𝒂𝟐𝟏∗ = [𝑦𝑦21/ 𝑦𝑦11 + 𝑦𝑦21 𝑐𝑐𝟐]𝑩𝑩 
𝒂𝟏𝟐∗ =  𝑦𝑦12/ 𝑦𝑦12 + 𝑦𝑦22 𝑐𝑐𝟏 𝑩𝑩 
𝒂𝟐𝟐∗ =  [𝑦𝑦22/ 𝑦𝑦12 + 𝑦𝑦22 𝑐𝑐𝟐]𝑩𝑩 














FIGURE 2. Common Attribute Costs but Different Technologies 
 
Suppose instead of a single funding forecast, the buyer (procurement official) reveals a 
range of possible budget estimates for the procurement (say optimistic, pessimistic, and most 
likely).17 Then Equations 6a’ and 6b’ can be combined to yield each vendor’s expansion path, 
given by: 
(7) 𝑎𝑎2𝑖𝑖  = [(𝑐𝑐1𝑖𝑖(𝐵𝐵) 𝑐𝑐2𝑖𝑖(𝐵𝐵))⁄ (𝑦𝑦2𝑖𝑖 𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖)⁄ ] 𝑎𝑎1𝑖𝑖 , for 𝑗𝑗 = 1,2. 
The two expansion paths defined by Equation 7 reveal optimal attribute bundles offered by each 
vendor at different possible funding levels, B. Each point on the expansion paths derived for 
each vendor reveals optimal attribute bundle offers (bid proposals) for each identical unit 
required, over different possible budgets.  
 
17 For example, see Simon & Melese 2011. 
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Given this formulation, if attribute costs and technology parameters are constant (i.e., 
independent of funding levels), then the expansion paths are linear.18 Expansion paths for the 
first case, where vendors’ share common costs but different technologies, are given by:  
(7a) 𝑎𝑎21  = [𝑐𝑐1 𝑐𝑐2⁄ ][𝑦𝑦21 𝑦𝑦11⁄ ] 𝑎𝑎11, for vendor 1, and 
 
(7b) 𝑎𝑎22  = [𝑐𝑐1 𝑐𝑐2⁄ ][𝑦𝑦22 𝑦𝑦12⁄ ] 𝑎𝑎12, for vendor 2. 
This is illustrated as two straight lines from the origin in Figure 2. For the specific per unit budget 
level, B, the two competing attribute bundle bid proposals offered by each vendor (from 
Equations 6a’ and 6b’) appear as points 𝐴𝐴1 = (𝑎𝑎11∗ ,𝑎𝑎21∗ ) and 𝐴𝐴2 = (𝑎𝑎12∗ ,𝑎𝑎22∗ ) on the competing 
vendors’ expansion paths. 
Vendors With Common Technologies and Different Costs  
Turning to the second example (illustrated in Figure 3), suppose vendors have different 
(constant) attribute costs, but identical (constant) engineering production functions (i.e., in 
Equation 6: 𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖 = 𝑦𝑦1 and 𝑦𝑦2𝑖𝑖 = 𝑦𝑦2 for j=1,2), together with constant returns to scale (such that: 
𝑦𝑦1 + 𝑦𝑦2 = 1;  𝑖𝑖. 𝑒𝑒. 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑦𝑦1 = 𝑦𝑦 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛 𝑦𝑦2 = 1 − 𝑦𝑦 ). In this case the two vendors’ optimal bid proposals 
for unit funding/budget level, B, are given by: 
(6a’’) 𝑎𝑎1𝑖𝑖∗ = [𝑦𝑦/𝑐𝑐1𝑖𝑖] B, and 
 
(6b’’) 𝑎𝑎2𝑖𝑖∗ = [(1 − 𝑦𝑦)/𝑐𝑐2𝑖𝑖] B, (j=1,2). 
 
EEoA: Vendor Expansion Paths with same Technology































FIGURE 3. Common Technology but Different Attribute Costs 
 
Similar to the first case, Figure 3 illustrates competing optimal attribute bundle bid 
proposals for each vendor, for the unit funding/budget level, B: 𝐴𝐴1 = (𝑎𝑎11∗ ,𝑎𝑎21∗ ) and 𝐴𝐴2 =
 
18 For example, see Nicholson & Snyder (2017), pp. 330–333. 
 
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 289 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
(𝑎𝑎12∗ ,𝑎𝑎22∗ ). Now the optimum for each vendor occurs at the point where their respective budget 
constraints are tangent to their common isoquant. If vendors’ technology and attribute cost 
parameters are constant (i.e., independent of funding levels), both expansion paths are again 
linear. Expansion paths for this second case (where vendors share a common technology, but 
have different attribute costs), are illustrated as two straight lines from the origin in Figure 3, 
given by: 
(7a’) 𝑎𝑎21  = [𝑐𝑐11 𝑐𝑐21⁄ ][(1 − 𝑦𝑦) 𝑦𝑦⁄ ] 𝑎𝑎11, for vendor 1, and 
 
 (7b’) 𝑎𝑎22  = [𝑐𝑐12 𝑐𝑐22⁄ ][(1 − 𝑦𝑦) 𝑦𝑦⁄ ] 𝑎𝑎12, for vendor 2. 
Focusing on this second case (where vendors share a common technology, but have 
different attribute costs), for any unit funding/budget level, B, connecting the two optimal vendor 
attribute production points (𝐴𝐴1 and 𝐴𝐴2) creates an attribute “production possibility frontier” (PPF), 
illustrated in Figure 3. The slope of this PPF reflects attribute trade-offs possible in the 
marketplace by switching from one vendor to another. This technical (or engineering) trade-off is 
given by the slope: ∆𝑎𝑎2/∆𝑎𝑎1 = (𝑎𝑎21∗ − 𝑎𝑎22∗ )/(𝑎𝑎11∗ − 𝑎𝑎12∗  ). 
The first stage vendor optimization problem in the two-stage EEoA framework highlights 
the importance of modeling the supply side (i.e., vendor decisions in response to anticipated 
future funding). The second stage focuses on the demand side (i.e., the procurement official’s 
source selection problem).19  
Second Stage EEoA: Procurement Official’s Problem (Demand Side) 
For any given requirement (quantity demanded), and forecasted per unit funding/budget, 
B, the procurement official (decision-maker) must rank the vendors’ (optimized) bid proposals. 
For example, consider attribute bundles such as those illustrated in Figure 3: Vendor 
1=>(𝑎𝑎11∗ ,𝑎𝑎21∗ ) and Vendor 2=>(𝑎𝑎12∗ ,𝑎𝑎22∗ ). Recall the lens through which the government evaluates 
competing vendors is the utility function given by Equation 1.20 In EEoA, the government 
supplier decision (“source selection”) depends on the public procurement official’s (decision-
maker’s) preferences revealed through explicit trade-offs for any pair of attributes that leave 
decision-maker’s indifferent in any given scenario. These explicit pair-wise comparisons elicited 
from a public procurement official (or expert decision-makers) generate relative weights 
assigned to the desired attributes. 
The public procurement official’s problem is to select a vendor 𝑗𝑗 ∈ [1,𝑚𝑚] with a bid 
proposal (per unit attribute bundle) 𝑨𝑨𝑖𝑖 = [𝑎𝑎1𝑖𝑖 ,𝑎𝑎2𝑖𝑖, … ,𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖]) that maximizes the government’s utility 
function given by Equation 1. Recall, following the standard assumption in the literature (see 
Keeney & Raiffa [1976]; Kirkwood [1997]), the utility/benefit provided by any vendor 𝑗𝑗 is given by 
the linear, separable utility function: 
(1’) 𝑼𝑼𝒋𝒋 = Uj�𝑨𝑨𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇� = 𝑾𝑾𝑨𝑨𝑖𝑖T = ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 
where the vector 𝑨𝑨𝒋𝒋 = [𝑎𝑎1𝑖𝑖 𝑎𝑎2𝑖𝑖 … 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖] represents the bundle of attributes (performance) of each 
unit, offered by each of the 𝑗𝑗 ∈ [1,𝑚𝑚] competing vendors. As discussed earlier, specific relative 
trade-off weights for every attribute are the procurement official’s private information, given by 
the vector:  
 
19 Note this second stage demand-side problem is the exclusive focus of most textbooks, the majority of the related 
decision sciences and operations research literature, and standard support tools and algorithms. 
20 An interesting extension of Equation 1 is developed later to address uncertainty when different possible scenarios 
(states of nature) impact the government’s utility function (for example, due to possible future changes in the 
political, economic, or threat environment). 
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𝑾𝑾 = (𝑤𝑤1,𝑤𝑤2,𝑤𝑤3, … ,𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛 | 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 ∈ ℝ+, 𝑖𝑖 ∈ [1,𝑛𝑛]). 
The procurement official is also fiscally informed, with a forecasted funding/budget (affordability) 
constraint for the procurement given by Equation 2. So the per unit price (total unit costs) of any 
vendor proposal, 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖, must fit within forecasted future funding (the anticipated per unit budget, 
𝐁𝐁), or 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 ≤  𝐁𝐁. The next step is to combine demand and supply (i.e., the procurement official’s 
source selection problem) with vendors’ (optimization-generated) bid proposals. The following 
simple source selection example demonstrates how EEoA integrates demand and supply. 
Demand and Supply: A Two Scenario, Two Vendor, Two Attribute Example 
For purposes of illustration, suppose a public procurement official responsible for UN 
peacekeeping missions is asked to select a vendor for a new fleet of Autonomous Electric Off-
road Light Armored Transport Vehicle (AEOLATV). Assume the anticipated (per unit) budget, B, 
for the program allows two competing vendors to offer the required set of vehicles, and that 
there are only two evaluation criteria in the government’s utility function: Top Speed of each 
vehicle measured in miles per hour (𝑎𝑎1), and Range measured in miles (𝑎𝑎2).21 In Figure 3, this 
involves a choice between vendor 1 that offers less speed but more range (𝑎𝑎11∗ ,𝑎𝑎21∗ ), and vendor 
2 that offers more speed, but less range (𝑎𝑎12∗ ,𝑎𝑎22∗ ).  
In EEoA, the source selection decision (vendor ranking) depends on the procurement 
official’s (decision-maker’s) preferences revealed through pair-wise comparisons (i.e., explicit 
acceptable trade-offs between pairs of attributes within a particular scenario). This generates 
relative weights assigned to the desired attributes within a particular scenario.  
A straightforward modification of Equation 1’ allows us to extend the analysis to address 
different possible scenarios (states of nature) that could impact the procurement official’s pair-
wise comparisons.22 Equation 8 accounts for k possible scenarios (or “states of nature”), NS, 
∀𝑠𝑠 ∈ [1,k], with corresponding probabilities, 𝑃𝑃(𝑁𝑁𝑠𝑠). This linear, separable expected utility 
function captures the differing relative weights, derived from explicit preference trade-offs 
among pairs of attributes that depend on specific scenarios (states of nature). Now the 
procurement official’s problem is to select the vendor (e.g., bidder or investment alternative), 𝑗𝑗 ∈
 [1,m], that maximizes the government’s expected utility given by:  
(8) E(𝑼𝑼𝒋𝒋) = ∑ 𝑃𝑃(𝑁𝑁𝑠𝑠)𝑘𝑘𝑠𝑠=1 ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. 
Consider a simple case with two possible states of nature N1 & N2, (e.g. Scenario s=1 a 
High Tech Threat environment, vs. Scenario s=2 a Low Tech Threat Environment), with 
corresponding probabilities, P(N1) and P(N2).23 From Equation 8, the government’s expected 
utility function (scoring rule) for the two scenario, two attribute case is: 
(8’) E(𝑼𝑼𝒋𝒋) = 𝑃𝑃(𝑁𝑁1)[𝑤𝑤11𝑎𝑎1𝑖𝑖+𝑤𝑤21𝑎𝑎2𝑖𝑖]+ 𝑃𝑃(𝑁𝑁2)[𝑤𝑤12𝑎𝑎1𝑖𝑖+𝑤𝑤22𝑎𝑎2𝑖𝑖]. 
Totally differentiating the procurement official’s (government’s) utility function (8’) and 
setting the result equal to zero in each scenario (N1 & N2), generates two sets of relative 
weights (or indifference curves). In general, relative weights for any two pairs of attributes 
(𝑎𝑎1,𝑎𝑎2) in each of the k scenarios in Equation 8 are given by: 
 
21 For example, we could assume all other characteristics (or attributes) of the vehicles offered by the vendors are the 
same, so top speed and range are the only differentiating factors. 
22 For example, different possible threat environments in which the United Nations might operate. 
23 In the AEOLATV example, scenario N1 could represent the possibility of facing a fast adversary with limited 




Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 291 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
(9) 𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎2/𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎1 = −(𝑤𝑤1𝑠𝑠/𝑤𝑤2𝑠𝑠) = −𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠, ∀𝑠𝑠 ∈ [1,k]. 
 
The last term in Equation 9, 𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 > 0, represents the acceptable trade-off determined by a 
decision-maker (procurement official) between any pair of attributes (𝑎𝑎1,𝑎𝑎2) for a specific 
scenario: 𝑤𝑤1𝑠𝑠 = (𝑤𝑤2𝑠𝑠)x(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠). It reflects acceptable pair-wise trade-offs for the government over 
the relevant range of attributes in each scenario. These preference trade-offs define linear 
indifference curves between any two pairs of attributes in each scenario (or piecewise linear 
approximations over specific ranges of attributes). The slopes of these indifference curves are 
the relative weights for each pair of attributes, in each state of nature, over relevant ranges of 
each attribute. 
Optimal vendor rankings in EEoA can be determined by comparing the slope of the 
government’s (buyer’s) revealed preferences (indifference curves), with the competing vendor-
proposed bundles of attributes (production possibility frontiers). For example, Figure 4 illustrates 
two different sets of indifference curves (dashed lines) that reflect two different scenarios. In 
turn, these yield two different vendor rankings.  
For a given per unit budget, B, if the slope of the indifference curve is steeper than the 
slope of the production possibility frontier (where the PPF reflects technical/engineering trade-
offs available between competing vendors), or if from Equation 9, -X = −(𝑤𝑤1/𝑤𝑤2) < −(𝑎𝑎21∗ −
𝑎𝑎22∗ )/(𝑎𝑎11∗ − 𝑎𝑎12∗  ), then vendor 2 is selected, since U2∗>U1. If the reverse is true, then vendor 1 
wins, since U1∗>U2 (see Figure 4).  
Suppose a government decision-maker (public procurement official) is willing to trade off 
relatively more range (𝑎𝑎2) for the same incremental increase in top speed (𝑎𝑎1) in scenario N1, 
than in scenario N2. For example: 20 miles of range for an extra 10 mph top speed in 𝑁𝑁1, versus 
only 10 miles for an extra 10 mph in 𝑁𝑁2. In this case,−𝑋𝑋1 = −2 < −𝑋𝑋2 = −1, implies the slope 
of the indifference curve is steeper (more negative) in Scenario 𝑁𝑁1 than in 𝑁𝑁2.24 From Figure 4, 
vendor 2 is ranked higher (offers greater utility) in scenario N1, and vendor 1 in scenario N2. 
This is consistent since the decision-maker revealed a stronger relative preference for top 
speed in scenario N1 (i.e., was willing to trade off more range), and vendor 2 offers relatively 
higher top speed (𝑎𝑎12∗ ) than vendor 1 (𝑎𝑎11∗ ). 
 
24 In this case, under scenario N1 vendor 2 ranks higher (offers greater utility) than vendor 1, and there is a rank 
reversal under scenario N2. 
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EEoA: Procurement Agency Choice








































𝑩𝑩 𝑼𝑼𝟏∗ = 𝒘𝟏𝒂𝟏𝟏∗  +  𝒘𝟐𝒂𝟐𝟏∗ =  𝑴𝑶𝑬𝟏
𝑼𝑼𝟐∗ = 𝒘𝟏𝒂𝟏𝟐∗  + 𝒘𝟐𝒂𝟐𝟐∗ =  𝑴𝑶𝑬𝟐
 
FIGURE 4. Procurement Agency Vendor Selection 
 
In general, probabilities assigned to each scenario in Equations 8 or 8’ generate an 
Expected Utility vendor ranking metric that consists of a probability-weighted average of pair-
wise attribute trade-offs (-Xs) that define expected utility functions in each of the 𝑠𝑠 ∈ [1,k] 
scenarios. For example, in the two scenarios, two vendors, two attributes case, this determines 
the slope of a new indifference curve that is a combination of the two indifference mappings 
illustrated in Figure 4. For any specified budget, the tangency (or corner point) of this new 
indifference curve with the PPF reveals the optimal Expected Utility ranking of the two vendors. 
The next section contrasts this EEoA with the standard textbook MCDM model commonly 
applied by public procurement officials to guide government supplier decisions. 
Comparison of EEoA and MCDM Models 
The topic of multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM) has spawned a rich literature with 
many variations to account for decision-making in complex scenarios. This section presents a 
standard textbook MCDM model frequently applied to guide government supplier decisions as a 
baseline (see Keeney & Raiffa [1976]; Kirkwood [1997]). We contrast this MCDM model with the 
EEoA approach within a single scenario. The MCDM additive value function typically used to 
rank vendors is given by:  
(10) 𝑽𝑽𝒋𝒋 = Vj�𝑨𝑨𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇� = 𝝀𝝀𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = ∑ 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖). 
This value function is the sum of individual value functions, 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), defined over relevant ranges 
of each attribute 𝑖𝑖 ∈ [1,𝑛𝑛], for any vendor 𝑗𝑗. The vector of preference weights is given by: 
𝝀𝝀 = (𝜆𝜆1, 𝜆𝜆2, 𝜆𝜆3 … , 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛 | 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 ∈ ℝ+, 𝑖𝑖 ∈ [1,𝑛𝑛]). 
The individual value functions 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) are typically monotonic and scaled (normalized), 
while the preference weights (𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖) reflect the importance of each attribute. While these weights 
(𝝀𝝀) are analogous to the relative weights (𝑾𝑾) in EEoA, they are only equivalent if raw attribute 
measures are used in MCDM instead of normalized values to determine pair-wise trade-offs 
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(i.e., iff 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖�𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� = 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖). For purposes of comparison with EEoA, it is convenient to assume 
procurement officials (decision-makers) are subject to the same funding/affordability constraint 
given by (2): 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 ≤  𝐁𝐁. Implications of this MCDM model are explored in the next section under 
the usual assumption that attribute measures are normalized using individual value functions 
with preferential independence.  
Implicit Trade-Offs in MCDM vs. Explicit Trade-Offs in EEoA  
From Equation 10, the only theoretical difference between the procurement official’s 
objective function (1) or (1’) in EEoA, and MCDM is an additional step in Equation 10 that 
involves normalizing attribute measures through individual value functions. In fact, the demand 
side of EEoA can be thought of as a special case of MCDM, where 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖�𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� = 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖.  
In theory, any value function, 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖, in conjunction with the appropriate attribute weights 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖, 
can recover the EEoA utility function for any given vector of attributes 𝑨𝑨𝒋𝒋.This is clear when we 
consider a procurement official’s value function with two attributes as before:  
(10’) 𝑽𝑽𝒋𝒋 =∑ 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖(𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) => [𝜆𝜆1𝑣𝑣1(𝑎𝑎1𝑖𝑖)+𝜆𝜆2𝑣𝑣2(𝑎𝑎2𝑖𝑖)]. 
Totally differentiating Equation 10 or 10’ and setting the result equal to zero yields implicit 
trade-offs in the MCDM approach between any two pairs of attributes (𝑎𝑎1, 𝑎𝑎2) (i.e., the first two 
terms in Equation 11). For sake of consistency given a particular decision-maker’s preferences, 
this should precisely correspond to the explicit trade-offs (revealed preferences) obtained from 
that decision-maker in EEoA (i.e., represented by the last two terms in Equation 9).  




While the MCDM approach adds a degree of freedom for procurement officials and 
expands the decision space, it risks obscuring explicit trade-offs between attributes revealed in 
the EEoA approach. From Equation 11, we see that: 
𝜆𝜆1 /𝜆𝜆2 = 𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠[𝑣𝑣2′(𝑎𝑎2)/𝑣𝑣1′(𝑎𝑎1)], or 
 
𝑍𝑍 = [𝑣𝑣2′(𝑎𝑎2)/𝑣𝑣1′(𝑎𝑎1)], 
where the constant Z= 𝜆𝜆1 /(𝜆𝜆2𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠). So in general, for any pair of attributes, and alternatives (i.e., 
vendors 𝑗𝑗 ∈ [1,m]),  
(12) 𝑍𝑍𝑣𝑣1′�𝑎𝑎1𝑖𝑖� = 𝑣𝑣2′(𝑎𝑎2𝑖𝑖). 
  
Integrating both sides of (12) yields: 
(13) 𝑣𝑣2(𝑎𝑎2𝑖𝑖)/𝑣𝑣1�𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� = 𝑍𝑍 = 𝜆𝜆1/(𝜆𝜆2𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠). 
That is to say, if the goal is to ensure EEoA and MCDM approaches generate the same rank 
ordering, procurement officials must set individual attribute value functions 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖’s and attribute 
weights 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖’s in the precise ratio specified in Equation 13.  
In practice, there is no reason to assume this happens, and reconciling the two 
approaches to generate the same rank ordering is non-trivial. While a procurement official may 
have a certain trade-off in mind between pairs of measurable attributes when developing the 
MCDM value function, normalizing each attribute with individual value functions, and selecting 
appropriate weights to assign to those value functions, can easily yield implicit pairwise trade-
offs among attributes that generate different rank orderings than the explicit pairwise trade-offs 
 
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 294 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
determined in EEoA.25 Which decision support model best elicits public procurement officials’ 
(decision-makers’) preferences remains an important empirical question and warrants further 
research. We now turn to another important contribution of EEoA: the importance of modeling 
the supply side; specifically, accounting for vendor responses to anticipated future funding. 
Accounting for Vendor Responses to Anticipated Future Funding 
Traditionally, MCDM models focus on the demand side of a public procurement and treat 
supply side vendor decisions as exogenous. This section demonstrates the potential value of 
explicitly accounting for vendor responses to anticipated future funding (affordability or 
procurement official’s budget constraints).  
Since each vendor’s expansion path represents their optimal attribute bundle bid 
proposals for any given budget (see Figures 2, 3, and 4), these expansion paths can easily be 
converted, through the buyer’s utility function (1’), into cost-effectiveness (or Budget-Utility) 
functions for each vendor. For example, substituting each vendor’s optimal attribute bundle 
(6a’’) & (6b’’) into Equation 1’ for any specific scenario yields two points in cost-effectiveness 
space that represent the utility of each vendor’s bid proposal for the per unit funding/budget, B: 
(U1∗,𝐁𝐁) and (U2∗ ,𝐁𝐁). Different budgets represented along the expansion paths generate different 
utility. For example, the cost-effectiveness/utility relationships illustrated in Figure 6 reflect the 
value to the government of each vendor’s offers at different funding levels.  
There is an important contrast between the endogenously derived EEoA cost-
effectiveness functions for each vendor, and the exogenous cost-effectiveness points 
generally used to represent vendor offers in MCDM.26 This becomes especially apparent when 
vendor costs depend on anticipated future funding. For instance, with bigger budgets, a 
vendor’s costs to provide more of a particular attribute (say computer memory) might enjoy 
increasing returns to scale because of quantity discounts, learning curves, the ability to employ 
just-in-time inventory techniques, or the possibility of adopting other process improvements that 
reduce a vendor’s costs of incorporating/producing a desired attribute. 
Consider the case illustrated in Figure 5, where vendor 1’s costs of producing attribute 1 
are assumed to depend on the funding level or anticipated per unit budget, B (i.e., 𝑐𝑐11(𝑩𝑩)). For 
ease of exposition, suppose both vendors 𝑗𝑗 = 1, 2 have identical, constant production 
technologies (i.e., 𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖 = 𝑦𝑦1 and 𝑦𝑦2𝑖𝑖 = 𝑦𝑦2), and constant returns to scale 𝑦𝑦1 + 𝑦𝑦2 = 1. The 
difference between them is in their individual attribute costs. As before, let 𝑐𝑐12(𝑩𝑩) =
𝑐𝑐12; 𝑐𝑐22(𝑩𝑩) = 𝑐𝑐22; and 𝑐𝑐21(𝑩𝑩) = 𝑐𝑐21, but now suppose vendor 1’s costs for attribute 1 depends on 
the budget. For example assume the following relationship: 𝑐𝑐11(𝐵𝐵) = 𝑐𝑐11 − 𝑘𝑘𝑩𝑩 > 0. Also let 𝑩𝑩 <
𝑐𝑐11/𝑘𝑘, 𝑐𝑐11 > 𝑐𝑐12, and 𝑘𝑘 ∈ [0,1).27 In this case (from (6a’’) and (6b’’)), each vendors’ optimal 
attribute bundle proposals for a unit funding/budget level 𝑩𝑩 is given by: 
 
25 Note: Linear normalization combined with careful swing weighting in MCDM could recover similar trade-offs to 
those explicitly revealed in EEOA (see Equation 9), resulting in an identical rank ordering of competing vendors. 
(An example is available upon request.) 
26 For an example of the latter, see the U.S. Defense Acquisition Guidebook, which states: “Cost-effectiveness 
comparisons in theory would be best if the analysis structured the alternatives so that all the alternatives have equal 
effectiveness (the best alternative is the one with lowest cost) or equal cost (the best alternative is the one with the 
greatest effectiveness). Either case would be preferred; however, in actual practice, in many cases the ideal of equal 
effectiveness or equal cost alternatives is difficult or impossible to achieve due to the complexity of AoA [Analysis 
of Alternatives] issues. A common method for dealing with such situations is to provide a scatter plot [of points 
representing competing vendor proposals] of effectiveness versus cost” (emphasis added; DoD, n.d., ch. 2–2.3., 2.7). 
27 These simple assumptions help illustrate our point. A model with quadratic costs could add another dimension (a 
“knee of the curve,” i.e., monotonic increasing with a single inflection point) to the cost-effectiveness function, 
which could offer an interesting extension of the model. 
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(14a) 𝑎𝑎11∗ = [𝑦𝑦/𝑐𝑐11(𝑩𝑩)] 𝑩𝑩 = [𝑦𝑦/(𝑐𝑐11 − 𝑘𝑘𝑩𝑩)]𝑩𝑩, 
 
(14b) 𝑎𝑎21∗ = [(1 − 𝑦𝑦)/𝑐𝑐21]𝑩𝑩, and 
 
(15a) 𝑎𝑎12∗ = [𝑦𝑦/𝑐𝑐12]𝑩𝑩, 
 
(15b) 𝑎𝑎22∗ = [(1 − 𝑦𝑦)/𝑐𝑐22]𝑩𝑩. 
 
Figure 5 illustrates each vendor’s optimal attribute bundle bid proposals (given by Equations 
14a and 14b and Equations 15a and 15b) for a specific budget, B (i.e., points 𝐴𝐴1: (𝑎𝑎11∗ ,𝑎𝑎21∗ ) and 
𝐴𝐴2: (𝑎𝑎12∗ ,𝑎𝑎22∗ )). 
 
EEoA: Procurement Agency Choice
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FIGURE 5. Vendor Selection When Vendor 1’s Attribute Costs Depend on Budget 
 
The expansion path for vendor 2 is again linear, with the same positive, constant slope 
for any budget (i.e., identical to (7b’)). However, since vendor 1’s attribute costs now depend on 
the anticipated per unit funding/budget, B, vendor 1’s expansion path is nonlinear, increasing at 
a decreasing rate as illustrated in Figure 5 and given by:28 
(16) 𝑎𝑎21  = [𝑐𝑐11(𝐵𝐵) 𝑐𝑐21⁄ ][(1 − 𝑦𝑦) 𝑦𝑦⁄ ] 𝑎𝑎11 = [(𝑐𝑐11 − 𝑘𝑘𝐵𝐵) 𝑐𝑐21⁄ ][(1 − 𝑦𝑦) 𝑦𝑦⁄ ] 𝑎𝑎11, 
where the slope (first derivative) is given by:  
(16’) 𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎21 𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎11⁄  = [𝑐𝑐11(𝐵𝐵) 𝑐𝑐21⁄ ][(1 − 𝑦𝑦) 𝑦𝑦⁄ ] = [(𝑐𝑐11 − 𝑘𝑘𝐵𝐵) 𝑐𝑐21⁄ ][(1 − 𝑦𝑦) 𝑦𝑦⁄ ] >0, 
 
 
28 The illustration of the two expansion paths assumes that throughout the relevant range of budgets (funding levels), 
(𝑐𝑐11(𝐵𝐵) 𝑐𝑐21⁄ ) > (𝑐𝑐12 𝑐𝑐22⁄ ). 
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and change in slope with a change in the budget (second derivative) given by: 
(16’’) 𝜕𝜕(𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎21 𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎11)⁄ /𝜕𝜕𝐵𝐵 = [𝑐𝑐11′(𝐵𝐵) 𝑐𝑐21⁄ ][(1 − 𝑦𝑦) 𝑦𝑦⁄ ] < 0. 
Substituting vendor 1 and 2’s optimal attribute bundle offers Equations 14a and 14b and 
Equations 15a and 15b into the procurement official’s (buyer’s) utility function for any given 
scenario in Equation 8’ yields:29 
(17) U1∗ =  𝑤𝑤1𝑎𝑎11∗ +  𝑤𝑤1𝑎𝑎21∗ = 𝑤𝑤1 [𝑦𝑦/𝑐𝑐11(𝐵𝐵)] 𝐵𝐵 + 𝑤𝑤2 [(1 − 𝑦𝑦)/𝑐𝑐21] 𝐵𝐵 
 
(18) U2∗ =  𝑤𝑤1𝑎𝑎12∗ +  𝑤𝑤1𝑎𝑎22∗ = 𝑤𝑤1 [y/𝑐𝑐12] 𝐵𝐵 + 𝑤𝑤2 [(1 − 𝑦𝑦)/𝑐𝑐22]𝐵𝐵. 
Equations 17 and 18 represent functions that can be plotted in cost-effectiveness (Budget-
Utility) space over a relevant range of funding scenarios (see Figure 6). In this case, assuming 
identical, constant costs for attribute 2 (i.e., 𝑐𝑐21 = 𝑐𝑐22 = 𝑐𝑐2), from Equations 17 and 18,  
 (19) U1∗ ⋛ U2∗  as 𝑐𝑐12 ⋛ 𝑐𝑐11(𝑩𝑩) = 𝑐𝑐11 − 𝑘𝑘𝑩𝑩 or as 𝑩𝑩 ⋛ (𝑐𝑐11 − 𝑐𝑐12)/𝑘𝑘 = 𝐵𝐵’. 
 
 
Economic Evaluation of Alternatives
Cost-Effectiveness (Budget-Utility) Analysis
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FIGURE 6. Vendor Selection in Cost-Effectiveness (Budget-Utility) Space 
 
What is revealed in Figure 6 is an optimal rank reversal. The relation given by Equation 19 
indicates it is optimal for the buyer to switch vendors at B’. For any unit funding/budgets B>B’, 
vendor 1 is ranked higher than vendor 2. The two are ranked the same for the budget, B=B’, 
and for budgets B<B’, vendor 2 is ranked higher than 1. As expected, evaluating the slopes of 
the two vendors’ cost-effectiveness functions at the switch point, B’=(𝑐𝑐11 − 𝑐𝑐12)/𝑘𝑘, yields:  
 (20) 𝜕𝜕U1∗ 𝜕𝜕𝑩𝑩⁄ > 𝜕𝜕U2∗ 𝜕𝜕𝑩𝑩⁄  or (𝑐𝑐11(𝑩𝑩) − 𝑐𝑐11′ (𝑩𝑩)𝑩𝑩)/𝑐𝑐11(𝑩𝑩)2 > 1/𝑐𝑐12 since 𝑐𝑐11 > 𝑐𝑐12. 
 
29 For a specific unit funding level B, this represents two optima that can be compared that represent the maximum 
utility a buyer can obtain from each vendor. This is illustrated in Figure 4 as the highest indifference curve attainable 
given the corresponding point on the attribute production possibility frontier. 
 
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 297 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
This highlights the importance of modeling the supply side. Specifically, this 
example emphasizes the importance for public procurement officials to obtain 
realistic budget forecasts for government programs, and to offer those as 
guidance to vendors. As two pioneers in defense economics Hitch and McKean 
(1967) wisely counseled: “As a starter ... several budget sizes can be assumed. If 
the same [vendor] is preferred for all … budgets, that system is dominant. If the 
same [vendor] is not dominant, use of several … budgets is nevertheless an 
essential step, because it provides vital information to the decision maker.”  
Instead of plotting procurement alternatives (vendor bid proposals) as single points in cost-
effectiveness (budget-value) space, EEoA encourages procurement officials in fiscally 
constrained environments to solicit bids over a range of possible budget scenarios.30 
From a practical standpoint, the biggest limitation of the EEoA approach is that as the 
number of attributes (𝑛𝑛) under consideration expands, it is increasingly burdensome to generate 
required pairwise comparisons. For example, assuming each alternative (vendor proposal) 
includes a set of 𝑛𝑛 attributes, applying EEoA requires 𝑛𝑛(𝑛𝑛−1)
2
 pairwise comparisons to fully flesh 
out the decision-maker’s preferences. Interestingly however, EEoA could be applied in 
combination with MCDM as a consistency check for important attributes. That is to say, if 
𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎2/𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎1 = −(𝑤𝑤1𝑠𝑠/𝑤𝑤2𝑠𝑠) =  −𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 is the explicitly determined trade-off that a public procurement 
official is comfortable with in a particular scenario, given specific ranges for each attribute, then 
weights developed in MCDM should reflect this relative preference (trade-off).31 The test simply 
involves application of Equation 11.  
In other words, procurement officials can generate pairwise comparisons for the most 
critical attributes as a consistency check. For example, when comparing options for AEOLATV 
procurement, it may be the case that Top Speed and Range are the most important attributes to 
consider among the dozens or even hundreds of other attributes. After carefully applying 
traditional MCDM techniques to develop measures of effectiveness for each AEOLATV 
alternative, use EEoA’s explicit trade-off determination to ensure that the decision-maker is 
indeed willing to trade X amount of Top Speed for Y amount of Range, and vice versa, in the 
specified attribute ranges. If the explicit trade-off determination is one that the decision-maker is 
uncomfortable with, it is crucial to revisit the value functions and weighting schemes used to 
generate the measures of effectiveness for each option. While this can be a time-consuming 
process, it ensures that the best alternative is chosen for large procurements to satisfy the 
mission. 
Conclusion and Avenues for Future Research 
This paper offers an economic model to assist public procurement officials to rank 
competing vendors when benefits cannot be monetized. The problem of ranking public 
investment alternatives when benefits cannot be monetized has spawned an extensive literature 
 
30 In this case, the standard technique of eliminating “dominated alternatives” could lead to sub-optimal decisions. 
For example, see Melese (2015) or the specific example of the EEoA model developed in Simon & Melese (2011). 
31 If the extra burden of normalization and swing weighting required in MCDM causes a decision-maker to 
“misevaluate” their trade-off preferences, then EEoA offers an alternative framework/perspective that can help to 
realign their weighting. Note that in theory a rational decision-maker with perfect information and infinite 
computational capability would never need to do this. Since in practice it is difficult to define “correct” weighting 
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that underpins widely applied decision tools. The bulk of the literature, and most government-
mandated decision tools, focus on the demand side of a public procurement. The EEoA extends 
the analysis to the supply-side.  
Introducing the supply side offers multiple avenues for future research. Notably, it 
provides fertile ground to apply both auction and game theory literatures. An interesting 
extension would be to leverage auction theory and introduce strategic shading of bids by 
vendors. Another is to consider the risk of collusion among vendors, or allow some vendors to 
enjoy economies of scale (or to make engineering production function parameters a function of 
the budget). Whereas EEoA models vendors as proposing bundles of characteristics to win a 
prize (i.e., funding), alternative optimization assumptions and strategic behaviors could be 
assumed.  
A rich opportunity also exists for both experimental and qualitative research to 
significantly improve public procurement. An important empirical question is whether 
procurement officials and managers would have an easier time using EEoA or MCDM (or some 
combination)? Consistency tests could be conducted in experimental settings to explore when 
the two techniques converge (offer identical vendor rankings), and when (and why) they 
diverge?  
In conclusion, the EEoA captures both demand side—government procurement official 
decisions—and supply side—vendor optimization decisions. A unique feature of EEoA is to 
model vendor decisions in response to government funding projections. Given a parsimonious 
set of continuously differentiable evaluation criteria, EEoA provides a new tool to rank vendors. 
In other cases, it offers a valuable consistency check for MCDM models to guide government 
supplier decisions. 
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